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Zusammenfassung 
Im Laufe des Jahres 1999 präzisierten die EU und Rußland in analogen Strategiedokumenten 
Charakter, Inhalt und Perspektiven ihrer wechselseitigen Beziehungen, wie sie im Vertrag über 
Partnerschaft und Kooperation (in Kraft seit Dezember 1997) grundsätzlich fixiert worden waren. 
In diesen Aktivitäten werden vor allem zwei Tendenzen deutlich. Zum einen gewinnt die 
europäische Richtung für die internationalen Beziehungen Rußlands an Gewicht: Die EU erweist 
sich für Moskau als leistungsstarker Handels- und Modernisierungspartner und entwickelt darüber 
hinaus in den Bereichen Wirtschaft und Finanzen internationale Beziehungen sowie zuletzt auch 
Sicherheit und Verteidigung zunehmend eigenständige Positionen. Zum anderen verweist ein 
Vergleich beider Strategiedokumente auf eine Reihe komplementärer Vorstellungen zukünftiger 
enger Kooperation. Allerdings hat Moskaus Krieg gegen Tschetschenien die Beziehungen EU-
Rußland inzwischen stark beeinträchtigt, so daß die Implementierung der in den 
Strategiedokumenten anvisierten Ziele vorerst faktisch blockiert ist. 
Russia's Interest 
At the Cologne Summit Meeting of June 1999, Russia has become the first country to which the new 
instrument of the European Union's "Common Strategy", as laid down in Amsterdam, has been ap-
plied.1 This is no accident. The preferential treatment demonstrates the great importance the EU at-
taches to Russia 's inclusion into the process of European co-operation. The reasoning behind this 
strategy is obvious: in one way or another, the developments in Russia are going to influence 
developments in the rest of Europe to a very high degree. Isolating Russia, even if it were anybody's 
intention to do so, is impossible because of Russia's seize, its geographic location and its potential. 
Europe has a strong interest that a stable, democratically oriented and prosperous Russia overcome its 
isolation during communist times and act with new self-confidence as an active and constructive 
member of the international community. Russia on its part has given a positive answer to the Common 
Strategy in a document entitled "Medium-Term Strategy for the Development of Relations between 
the RF and the European Union (2000-2010)".2 It presumably has the support of head of government 
                                                     
1 "The European Union's Common Strategy for Russia", adopted by the European Council in Cologne, Brussels 1999. 
2  According to the not yet published English version of the document. See also Foreign Minister Ivanov, Yevropa v predd-
verii XXI veka, in: Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn (henceforth: M.Z., Moscow) 1/1999, p. 8-13; and also V. Likhachev: Yevro-
peysky Soyuz v strategicheskoy perspektive, in: M.Z. 1/2000, pp. 40-49. 
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Putin for it was him who handed the document to the Union's Troika at the EU-Russia summit meeting 
in Helsinki (October 1999). It is not difficult to understand why Russia should react so positively: 
− In Moscow, the EU is considered the most important partner for transformation and modernisation. 
Russia conducts almost 40 percent of its foreign trade with the EU. 64 percent of direct investment 
in Russia originates in EU member states. Exploiting this potential for economic development to 
the full is highly attractive for the Russian elites, the more so since Russia does not have to fear 
imperial ambitions on the part of the EU.3 
− In Russia, the making of a European Foreign and Security Policy including a defence component is 
being watched with great attention even though Russian observers still find it hard to make up their 
mind about this new development. On one side are those who continue, in a traditional vein, to put 
the envisaged intensification of Russia's relations with the EU/WEU at the service of their dealings 
with the USA. At the same time, there is an increasing tendency to regard the EU and its Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as an important autonomous element of international relations, 
hence to stop considering it solely in terms of the Russian-American relationship. Such assessment 
adds to Moscow's efforts to support the establishment of a multipolar world in international 
relations and work against a US dominated unipolarism. According to the Moscow strategy paper 
the EU-Russia partnership would serve "to ensure pan-European security by the Europeans 
themselves without both isolation of the United States and NATO or their dominance on the 
continent". 
− Russia is increasingly worried that the EU's eastern enlargement could lead to Russia being cut off 
from the process of European integration, as shown in such important areas as the Schengen regime 
or foreign trade restrictions. These developments, it seems, give rise to much stronger fears in 
Russia than the NATO opening towards Eastern Europe has done. Therefore, Moscow aims at 
intensifying its relations with Brussels in order to prevent any deepening of the dividing lines 
between Russia's western and Europe's eastern borders.4 The Russian leadership has repeatedly 
expressed its desire to Brussels to undertake research within the Tacis programme to look into the 
consequences of the EU enlargement. 
− In case the Euro transforms the existing unipolar world currency order into a bipolar one, in other 
words if the Euro should become the dollar's rival as a world reserves currency and maybe even 
crowd out the dollar in Russia and the CIS, further Russian rethinking would be stimulated. The 
first analyses in Moscow were late in coming but they assessed the Euro's effects optimistically and 
considered the new currency an important contribution to the stabilisation of partnership between 
Russia and the EU. The Euro, so the argument went in Moscow, was blessed to "de-dollarise" 
Russia which had become dangerously dependent on the USD, as well as to substantially facilitate 
trade between the partners.5 Moreover, Moscow is observing with great attention that the Euro is in 
the process of "globalising" Europe. Already today, the Euro-zone countries possess 30 percent of 
all IMF votes, compared to the USA with 18 percent. However, the Euro needs to prove a stable 
currency if it is to realise such Russian expectations. Against this background, the Moscow 
Medium-Term Strategy argues for "a broader use of the Euro in the external economic activities of 
Russian firms and banks" as well as for enhancing and consolidating contacts with the European 
Central Bank, the European System of Central Banks and other bodies of the EU in order to co-
ordinate actions in view of future reform of the international financial system.  
                                                     
3 For details see: H.-H. Höhmann/Chr. Meier, Conceptual, Internal and International Aspects of Russia's Economic Securi-
ty, in: A. Arbatov/K. Kaiser/R. Legvold, Russia and the West, The 21st Century Security Environment, New York 1999, 
p. 77-97. 
4 See H. Timmermann/T. Dudnikova, Zadacha Yevropeyskogo Soyuza i Rossii – ne dopustit novykh razdelitelnykh liniy, 
in: Yevro (Moscow) 11/1999, pp. 21-24. 
5 Cf. V. Shemyatenkov/O. Butorina/D. Butakov/M. Yershov, Yedinaya yevropeyskaya valyuta yevro i natsionalnye in-
teresy Rossii, in: Yevro 12/1999, p. 34-41. This contribution is a specialist report for the government and Central Bank of 
Russia. 
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In this context, Putin evaluates the EU-Russia partnership in a positive way and emphasises that "if the 
EU on its part is interested, too, then the next century could be a time of practical work in order to cre-
ate new, higher forms of co-operation between Russia and the EU".6 Ambassador Likhachov, head of 
the Russian diplomatic mission with the EU in Brussels, went so far as to declare Russia's relations 
with the EU as "the most important relationship of Russian foreign policy".7
Central Areas of Co-operation: Chances and Problems 
For the time being, the implementation of the EU's Common Strategy has in actual fact been revised, 
reduced or even halted by the war in Chechnya. There is no doubt that this war has destroyed some 
illusions: Russia has visibly moved back from the European consensus on values as laid down, for 
instance, in the Treaty on Partnership and Co-operation. It has been the basic point of reference for 
EU-Russian relations since coming into force in December 1997. Meanwhile, Moscow is again 
considering human rights questions to be exclusively internal affairs of Russia. Putin's fundamental 
paper of December 1999 underlines this fact.8 Nevertheless, the Europeans should not resign 
themselves to mere attentism or – even worse – resort to punishing Russia by containment. The EU 
should remind Moscow that actions like the war of annihilation in Chechnya will prove costly to 
Russia: Thus, joint projects with the EU, as set out in the Common Strategy and for the most part 
taken up by the Medium-Term document, are suspended, postponed and possibly cancelled.  
Generally speaking, the question is to establish a pragmatic-realistic partnership which takes account 
of the following statements of Putin's paper: Russia intends to pursue its own way domestically as well 
as become a key area, a point of reference of its own internationally. Moreover, the Medium-Term 
Strategy paper has stated with unprecedented clarity that Russia sees itself as a European and Asian 
power which has no intention to formally associate itself with or join the EU: "As a world power 
situated on two continents, Russia should retain its freedom to determine and implement its domestic 
and foreign policies, its status... and the independence of its position and activities at international 
organisations". Russia does not want to be a periphery but form a cosmos of its own, big and 
independent enough to be a central player itself. Taking this aspiration into account, the following will 
elucidate some of the EU Common Strategy's extensive offers which seem especially important and 
urgent, and which could serve as incentive to Russia to behave more reasonably and in accordance 
with common values and interests: 
1. The Common Strategy proposes to develop the EU-Russia partnership within the framework of a 
"permanent dialogue on politics and security" as well as to create a "standing mechanism" for this 
purpose. According to the Common Strategy document, the development of joint initiatives with 
regard to Russia's neighbours can form part of such a dialogue. This, however, must certainly not 
further CIS integration under Russian dominance, as the Moscow strategy paper seems to suggest. 
A more realistic option, for instance, could be joint explorations for future developments in the 
southern Caucasus where EU partnership treaties with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan came into 
force in July 1999. Maybe Russia might be prepared to co-operate more closely with the EU in 
order to solve open conflicts and to stabilise the region.9 It is interesting to note that the Russian 
strategy paper avoids any polemics against the regional infrastructural projects TRACECA and 
INOGATE, which bypass Russia and to which the EU has strongly committed itself. Instead, the 
Moscow paper's authors are content with demanding that Russian firms should be offered adequate 
participation in these projects aimed at developing the traffic and transportation corridor Europe-
Caucasus-Asia and to repair, modernise and extend oil and gas pipelines. The, at last, successful 
inclusion of Russia into the Kosovo crisis management could also give impetus to a more 
                                                     
6 "Der Westen darf nicht Sieger spielen", in: Süddeutsche Zeitung (Munich) 23 December 1999. 
7 V. Likhachev, Rossiya i Yevropeysky Soyuz v strategicheskoy perspektive, op. cit., p. 44. 
8 Rossiya na rubezhe tysyacheletiya, in: Nezavisimaya gazeta (Moscow), 30 December 1999. 
9 See V. Baranovsky/A. Arbatov, The Changing Security Perspective in Europe, in: A. Arbatov/K. Kaiser/R. Legvold, op. 
cit., pp. 44-73. 
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constructive Russian attitude concerning a closer co-operation with the EU when it comes to 
solving Caucasus conflicts.10 This could also apply to other regions. After all, in view of the 
emerging European defence identity, the Russian leadership declares in its Strategy paper to be 
prepared to co-operate in military matters and to "join hands when it comes to preventing and 
solving local conflicts". 
 Another difficult matter mentioned in the Common Strategy where it would be reasonable to find 
common ground is Kaliningrad: the peculiar, politically sensitive geographic location of the region 
as a future EU enclave entails an urgent necessity to find a solution with Kaliningrad remaining an 
integral part of Russia while at the same time functioning as an active partner of the EU and Baltic 
Sea Co-operation. The region's main problem, after all, it is not security but further economic and 
social decline. It is noteworthy that the Russian Strategy paper expresses a general consent to some 
special agreement with the EU whereas before Moscow had declared the Kaliningrad problem to be 
a purely internal affair. Thus Kaliningrad could for instance be declared an area of eased visa 
regime or, in fact, a visa-free zone. It seems that Moscow could agree to such a solution even 
though the people of Kaliningrad would then be strongly privileged compared to other Russians. 
This would be an important contribution to securing the survival of the Russian exclave 
Kaliningrad as part of the Baltic Sea Co-operation, its infrastructure and networks. According to 
the Russian strategy paper, the interests of the people of Kaliningrad could be protected, when the 
EU expands as long as Brussels and Moscow reach a pertinent agreement. At the same time, 
however, other interesting developments are possible: "the transformation of Kaliningrad into a 
Russian pilot region within the framework of the Euro-Russian co-operation in the 21st century".  
2. In several places, the Russian Strategy paper emphasises conspicuously the significance of foreign 
investment for the stabilisation and modernisation of the economy and the state. Moreover, this as-
pect plays an important role in the Putin-paper, too. This should make the EU stress even more the 
central preconditions for stronger foreign commitment as laid down in the relevant passages of the 
Union's Common Strategy: the need for reliable tax laws, the possibility to acquire land, efficient 
institutions, a secure legal system, clearly defined rules of the game. At least with regard to the first 
two points – taxes and land – the new Duma might be prepared to abandon its predecessor's 
resistance. 
3. Another key point of the EU's Common Strategy is European commitment to the Russian regions – 
quite rightly so because it is easier to manage the projects and find the right partners, to speak and 
work with people on a regional level. More importantly, these relations which are supplemented by 
a great number of decentralised agreements between Russian and West European regions are 
helping to integrate also the Russian regions into European structures. In contrast to some 
statements made in the media and by some politicians, the Moscow Strategy paper does not in the 
least envisage risks of separatism in this respect but explicitly encourages the regions to respond to 
these initiatives. The regions should have the opportunity, so the Moscow paper, to actively 
participate in the development of partnership with the European Union in the economic and 
humanitarian fields as well as in the implementation of transboundary co-operation programs. To 
Moscow, massive Western investment into regional projects are very welcome. As the former 
prime minister Stepashin explained, they support the build-up of centres "where new goods, 
services and labour markets arise, in short: centres of economic growth for the coming century".11 
This is especially true for Russia's western regions, Russian experts argue: regions located at the 
border to the enlarging EU and thus in a position to revive their traditional relations to former part-
ners of East Central Europe.12 And indeed, the Russian regions which enjoy comprehensive rights 
thanks to the liberalisation of foreign trade relations and the development of federalism are ever 
                                                     
10 For more details see D. Wolter, Die Kaukasus-Politik der Europäischen Union, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschehen (Bonn), 
B 42/1999, pp. 32-39. 
11 Stepashin's speech at the World Economic Summit Meeting in Salzburg on 1 July 1999, according to the manuscript. 
12 A. Shishayev, Nashi dela s Yevropeyskim Soyuzom, in: M.Z. 10/1999, pp. 100-112, here: p. 106. 
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more interested in the EU and its member countries. The central Moscow authorities' economic and 
financial policy failures will most probably compel the Russian regions to increase their initiatives 
in future. Against this background it would be counterproductive if the Moscow were to strengthen 
its central power while at the same time strictly limiting the regions' autonomy, as the Putin 
administration seems to be about to do.13 Such a step would greatly hinder for instance the ever 
more intensifying relations between German federal states and Russian regions. 
4. In dealing with a co-operative Russia it would be advisable to make sure that the inclusive policy 
of partnership and co-operation will not be damaged or neutralised by an exclusive policy of 
containment and delimitation. One has to find a balance between securing the EU borders to Russia 
on the one hand and the need for cross-border co-operation on the other. Another example: Russia 
has indeed registered the advantages it may enjoy with the EU's eastern enlargement. 
Paradoxically, Moscow sometimes evaluates the EU's expansion – in contrast to NATO's eastern 
enlargement – more positively than some capitals of EU member states. Moscow realises quite well 
that the market for Russian products will increase, transit routes and border regimes for trade will 
be unified and become more reliable, customs tariffs within the EU area harmonised.14 Still, 
Moscow does have some worries. One of them is: as soon as the membership candidates take up 
EU norms, like for instance with regard to technical, consumer and environmental standards, the 
already greatly reduced trade between Russia and these countries might shrink even further. The 
EU should not try and push Russia out of Eastern and Central European markets. It is rather a 
question of concretising the help offered with the Common Strategy in order to assist Russia in 
adopting to EU norms and standards, especially since such help is expressly asked for in the 
Russian Medium-Term Strategy. It is noteworthy that in this paper Moscow declares its willingness 
to change the Russian laws accordingly. 
The EU, Russia and the War in Chechnya: What Is to Be Done? 
There are a number of other important dimensions of the Common Strategy which started to be imple-
mented but have at least partly put on hold at the moment because of the war in Chechnya. This has 
happened, for instance, in the case of the "Northern Dimension" project, the further development of a 
trans-European infrastructure and energy pipelines, co-operation in the field of environmental 
protection and, last but not least, some decentralised initiatives – for the first time mentioned in detail 
in the Common Strategy – including city partnerships, cultural activities, partnerships between 
professional organisations, enterprises, educational institutions. Such activities "from below" are an 
important stimulus to the building of a civil society in Russia. Unfortunately, the Russian document 
provides no equivalent to these initiatives in support of local projects as advanced by the EU's 
Common Strategy. Many among Moscow's elites are not interested in developing a civil society. This 
lack of interest has a negative effect not only on the democratisation process in Russia but also on a 
possible increase in those links between the partner societies which form an important part of the EU-
Russia relations. 
The Russian side has repeatedly expressed interest in combining both strategy papers into a single one 
entitled "Prospective Plan of Mutual Long Term Relations" in order to develop further the Treaty on 
Partnership and Co-operation.15 But in view of the Chechen war, the chances that such a project will 
be realised are rather slim not the least because the EU is faced with a dilemma in its relations with 
Moscow. On the one side, tough measures are called for if only to maintain the EU's credibility. The 
brutal war that Russia is waging on its own population massively violates human and minority rights, 
norms, standards and principles which the country has committed itself to observe vis-à-vis the OSCE, 
                                                     
13 Cf. for example the "National Security Conception of the Russian Federation", in: Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 January 2000. 
14 Cf. Deputy Foreign Minister Ye. Ivanov, Pora vkhodit na vzaimnye mery po pooshchreniyu yevropeyskikh investitsiy v 
Rossiyu, in: Yevro (Moscow) 9-10/1999, p 3 sq. Similarly E. Keshin, The Intersection of Economics and Politics in Rus-
sia, in: A. Arbatov et al., Russia and the West, op. cit., pp. 98-126, here p. 117 sq. 
15 Ye. Ivanov, My ne izhduvency a zrelye partnery, in: Kommersant Vlast' (Moscow) 41/19 Oct. 1999, p. 11. 
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the European Council as well as by the Partnership Treaty vis-à-vis the EU. In addition, it is possible 
that the Putin regime is trying to modernise Russia on a authoritarian-technocratic basis with only 
limited room for European standards and values. Moreover, such a Russian approach might entail a 
certain distance to the West to satisfy the patriotic consensus in Russia. On the other side, the EU is 
hardly in a position to impose effective sanctions or, if it were, such punitive measures would probably 
harm the long term prospects of EU-Russia relations (for example in the form of aggressive 
nationalism, self-isolation and/ or growing chaos potential in the international environment). Because 
of these reasons, the EU restricted itself to mainly symbolic measures, among others by reallocating 
Tacis means to other areas such as the advancement of democracy and humanitarian assistance, stricter 
control of unfair Russian trade practices in the steel and textile sectors, and finally also to a re-
examination of the "Common Strategy". 
What can the EU do in this dilemma? Apart from restricting measures employed so far the EU could 
find a more constructive approach by constantly reminding the Russian elites of the harm Russia will 
suffer if it ignores rules of behaviour which are the basis for implementing and developing its partner-
ship with the EU. Such loss of possible benefits could occur in exactly those areas where Moscow's 
strategy paper has asked the EU for support and commitment: foreign direct investment in real produc-
tion, integration in the WTO, prevention of new dividing lines at the eastern borders of an expanding 
EU, adaptation of the Russian financial and trading system to the Euro with its challenges and chances 
for Russia. Such incentives could encourage the reform forces in Russia and put a check on the use of 
violence against Russia's own population which is incompatible with the partnership. In addition, such 
a European approach could compel the new Putin leadership to return to long term policy conceptions 
after a phase of short term domestic policy and tactical considerations during the Duma and 
presidential elections. 
In view of the above the following can be stated firmly: unlike in the nineties, the EU's engagement 
must henceforth be based on current Russian realities and a reasonable assessment of its future 
possibilities, not on the hopes of the early nineties. What is important is a pragmatic long-term policy 
guided by European interests and the aim of increasing compatibility in the areas democracy and 
human rights, economic order and international relations. The Europeans should thus neither be 
guided by illusions nor get discouraged by setbacks. After all Europe will remain a central focus of 
Russian concerns. Despite widespread talk of Russia as a Eurasian power, the Russian political elite 
and public see their country first and foremost as a European power. In contrast to Soviet times, we 
now encounter a great number of different actors on the central, regional and local level where varying 
segments are interested in continuing reforms: politicians and professionals, economic and financial 
circles, the younger generations in general. For all of them, the implementation of the Common 
Strategy is of great significance. Among all regions of the world, Europe is the one to which Russia 
has the closest ties historically, politically, economically and culturally. Three quarter of Russia's 
population are living in the country's European sector – when they look beyond their borders they look 
mostly in the European direction. 
 Heinz Timmermann 
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